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Civil law remedies are a credible and effective tool for 
countries interested in recovering stolen assets----both when 
criminal procedures are unlikely to yield a result or in addition 
to such measures. They do not replace criminal prosecutions 
and confiscation but they complement them by attacking the 
economic base of corrupt activities and by focusing on victims’ 
interests. While common law offers a wider array of options to 
exercise proprietary claims on stolen assets, for personal claims 
both common and civil law systems offer reasonably similar 
avenues. Jurisdictions should consider increasing their use of 
legislation and legal concepts dealing with civil measures to 
recover profits obtained and damages suffered as a result of 
corrupt activities. Recent success stories involving private civil 
proceedings illustrate how such a strategic use and combination 
of available tools can boost asset recovery efforts. 
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Following the entry into force of the UN Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005 and more recently the Arab Spring and 
a string of scandals in the financial sector, the topic of corruption and 
its proceeds has steadily risen up the international policy agenda. The 
G8, the G20, and many regional and civil society organizations, are 
all putting forward ideas on how best to tackle it. This article aims to 
provide a modest contribution to that debate by focusing on an often 
overlooked avenue for going after corruption. Before doing so 
however, it is important to be clear about the terms, and specifically 
about the meaning of the concept of corruption.  
I. Introduction: What is Corruption and  
How Do We Respond?  
In essence, corruption is an agency problem: one person (the 
agent), be he an elected politician or a director of a bank, is supposed 
to be acting in the best interests of someone else (the principal), be it 
the people of a nation as embodied in the state or the bank’s 
shareholders as embodied in the bank itself. Instead the agent allows 
his personal interests to take precedence. The agent is furthering his 
own interests at the expense of the principal. To be clear, principal-
agent in its broad sense is not to be confined to its strict legal 
meaning, but rather as a sociological description of relationships. 
Though traditionally defined as ‘‘the abuse of public office for private 
gain,’’ the distinction between public and private sector corruption is 
really secondary, concerning only how the power is vested. We 
therefore agree with recent definitions of corruption as encompassing 
all forms of abuse of entrusted power. In its internal rules on 
preventing fraud and corruption, the World Bank defines a corrupt 
practice as ‘‘the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of 
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another party,’’1 without distinguishing between private or public 
sector. Similarly, Transparency International defines corruption as 
‘‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’’2  
The global legal standard for the fight against corruption, the 
UNCAC, does not contain a definition of corruption itself. Instead, in 
Chapter 3, the UNCAC lists a whole array of conduct that is 
considered to be corrupt, including both public and private sector 
bribery and the embezzlement of both public and private sector 
funds,3 thus implicitly endorsing the same idea, namely that 
corruption straddles both the public and the private spheres. 
In deciding how to respond to corruption, the course of action 
most often discussed is criminal action. When confronted with an 
abuse of power, we almost inevitably first look to the state to take 
enforcement action against the wrongdoer-----typically combining a 
prison term with the confiscation of the profits from the corrupt act. 
Such action could entail a criminal case by a state against the corrupt 
defendant or against his assets, or it could entail action in more than 
one state if the property to be confiscated is located in a state 
different from where the corrupt behavior occurred. The default 
inclination is to take criminal action-----possibly because of the 
corrosive effect to society as a whole. We wish to see the harm done 
to the community redressed and look to the criminal prosecutor to 
put things right. However, such a response, though understandable, 
misses an important component of the effects of corruption. Certainly, 
trust has been betrayed and the transgressor must be held 
accountable, but in addition corruption causes tangible damage to 
society as a whole or to a particular person or category of persons. 
Someone has suffered concrete damages as a result of corrupt acts and 
needs to receive compensation for their loss. In response to that loss, 
we should not be primarily focused on criminal trials but should 
rather direct our attention towards private civil action and restorative 
justice.4 This article aims to contribute to the current debate on how 
1. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA 
CREDITS 10 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/ProcGuid-10-06-ev1.pdf. 
2. What is the Corruption Perceptions Index?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
(2011), http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail. 
3. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, arts. 15--42, Dec. 
14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC]. 
4. In this article, the term ‘‘private civil law’’ is defined as that branch of 
law within a national system that is not criminal law, nor other 
branches of law defined mainly by a monopoly of the public authorities 
as entities that are empowered to commence legal actions. For example, 
if a prosecutor brings a case for bribery, that is a criminal action (that 
could end in jail time and monetary penalties). If a country brings a 
lawsuit for misappropriation of assets against that same wrongdoer, that 
is a private civil action (that typically ends with an award of 
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to deal with corruption by shining a light on the hitherto underused 
tools that private civil law can provide in seeking to redress corrupt 
behavior. It will do so specifically by providing an insight into how 
private civil action can repair the financial damage suffered by a 
victim. It will focus, in other words, on the remedies offered by 
private law to recover assets and obtain compensation from the 
wrongdoer. 
Of course we do not wish to minimize the importance of criminal 
prosecutions and confiscation when trying to remedy acts of 
corruption. Criminal law expresses society’s disapproval of the corrupt 
act and aims at punishment, while civil law focuses on victims’ 
interests and aims at compensation and restitution. An effective 
response to corruption requires the concurrent use of both criminal 
and civil law remedies. Civil law remedies can complement criminal 
sanctions by attacking the economic base of corrupt activities both in 
the public and the private sector. As Tim Daniel and James Maton 
point out, ‘‘asset recovery efforts need flexibility’’ and thus a range of 
mechanisms needs to be employed to achieve the desired result.5 
Recent success stories of asset recovery via private civil proceedings 
can illustrate how. 
This article provides a brief overview of the way in which civil 
actions can contribute to the fight against corruption. Apart from the 
more philosophical reasons why civil remedies merit attention, there 
are also more practical issues to be considered. Many criminal law 
systems do yet not allow for the distribution of the confiscated 
amount to the victim of the crime. Though this shortcoming may be 
circumvented in cases of public corruption by a sharing agreement 
between states, this is not possible in private corruption cases. 
In addition, in most grand corruption cases, certainly where serial 
acts of corruption have been committed over a longer period of time, 
even if some or all the acts of corruption are proven, it is nearly 
impossible to trace all their proceeds (i.e., follow funds from their 
immediate incarnation as the proceeds of a corrupt act onwards along 
a trail of layered bank accounts and investments). It often happens 
that some assets beneficially owned or held by the suspect are frozen, 
but that the paper trail is incomplete (due to non-cooperative 
jurisdictions or lack of documentation or evidence), preventing the 
compensation or the turnover of specified assets and cannot end with 
jail time). Hence, ‘‘civil law’’ may also be referred to as ‘‘private law,’’ in 
terms of laws under which non-state actors may commence legal actions. 
The phrase ‘‘civil law’’ in this context is not intended to mean ‘‘civil 
law’’ as opposed to ‘‘common law,’’ designating different types of legal 
systems.   
5. Tim Daniel & James Maton, Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption by 
Public Officials: A Case Study, in RECOVERING STOLEN ASSETS 463 
(Mark Pieth ed., 2009). 
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establishment of an evidential link between a specific crime and the 
assets, which is still required in many systems of law to establish an 
in rem (or proprietary) claim. In addition, substantial portions of 
proceeds of corruption are often spent on luxury items which have a 
high maintenance cost and depreciate quickly. As most criminal law 
systems do not (yet, we hope) allow for the confiscation of assets 
which are not related to the crime as replacement value, civil 
proceedings, by establishing a general claim for damages, can provide 
a remedy to these problems. 
Finally, civil remedies also allow an injured party to seek full 
damages from third parties whose forfeitable criminal gains may be 
negligible. A bank, which knowingly assists in the laundering of 
proceeds, may have only gained 1%--3% per year on the account used 
for the laundering of the proceeds. In a criminal case that small 
percentage would be the only forfeitable criminal gain; in a civil case 
however, certain jurisdictions allow the bank to be sued for the entire 
damage that is caused.  
By identifying challenges and best practices and providing many 
case examples, it becomes clear that civil law remedies are a credible 
and effective tool for countries interested in recovering stolen assets in 
the courts of another country, especially when criminal law avenues 
are either not available or have a low likelihood of success. First, this 
article provides an overview of the types of actions available to a 
victim of corruption seeking redress. Then the article details some of 
the ways in which the monetary awards to be paid to the victim can 
be calculated. 
II. Types of Actions 
A defrauded principal has different options available to him to 
recoup some of the losses he has suffered. He may have either a 
proprietary claim to enforce his ownership rights on a particular 
identifiable asset or a personal claim against a particular person or 
entity for damages.6 The advantage of the former is that a proprietary 
claim is enforceable independently of the status of unsecured creditors 
of the defendant. A particular piece of property attributable to the 
corrupt act may be available exclusively to the principal and cannot 
be used to satisfy the claims of other creditors. Thus, if the principal 
6. Equitable proprietary claims are available in cases involving abuse of 
power by an agent where English law (or one of its many derivatives in 
the British Commonwealth) applies. No property claim can be mounted 
on the basis of the civilian legal tradition found in continental Europe 
(and its derivative legal systems), per se. However, as a practical matter 
and through the application of anti-money-laundering laws or criminal 
proceedings where the victim may act as a partie civile, a similar result 
to the common law tracing and proprietary claim remedies can be 
achieved in civil law countries. 
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holds a proprietary claim to an asset that is part of an estate in 
bankruptcy, the principal can enforce his claim against that asset as if 
there were no bankruptcy. If he holds only a personal claim and the 
agent is impecunious or bankrupt, his claim will be satisfied in equal 
measure to all other creditors, and he may obtain only a small part of 
his full claim. In this situation a proprietary claim is preferable. In 
other situations, however, personal claims may be useful (e.g., when 
the corrupt act has caused personal damage independent of an asset 
or damage surpassing the value of a particular asset). 
Below we will discuss these civil actions available to a state 
victim of corruption or a defrauded employer. As we shall see, 
common law offers a wider array of options to exercise proprietary 
claims, whereas for personal claims both common and civil law 
systems offer reasonably similar options. 
A. Proprietary Actions  
The UNCAC explicitly recognizes states’ obligations to ‘‘take such 
measures as may be necessary to permit another State Party to 
initiate civil action in its courts to establish title to or ownership of 
property acquired through the commission of [a corruption] offence’’ 
and to ‘‘recognize another State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of 
property [so] acquired.’’7 An owner of an asset should be able to 
exercise his full rights to that asset, no matter who has possession of 
it. That is the basic idea underlying proprietary actions under both 
civil and common law systems. The difference lies in distinctions in 
the way that ownership is understood. The slightly more 
differentiated understanding of ownership under common law allows 
for a wider variety of legal action. 
1. The constructive trust  
Unlike civil law systems, the common law makes a distinction 
between the person holding legal title to an asset and the person 
holding so-called beneficial title to it, the beneficial owner.8 The latter 
is the one ultimately in control of the asset, who should ultimately be 
enjoying the benefit of the asset in question. In many cases, the legal 
and beneficial owner will be one and the same person (e.g., I am the 
legal owner of my car and am also the one in full control of it, 
enjoying its benefits) but in some cases they will not. The prime 
example is the trustee who holds legal title to a piece of real estate, 
but may do so for the benefit of certain beneficiaries who may not yet 
7. UNCAC, supra note 3, art. 53(a) & (c). 
8. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 553−54 (2012) (discussing the current status of legal 
and beneficial ownership in courts of equity as opposed to the courts 
found in most American states).  
620 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
Using Civil Remedies in Corruption and Asset Recovery Cases 
have come of age. The trustee has a fiduciary duty towards the 
beneficiaries to take proper care of the asset in question. How this 
distinction is applied under English law in situations of bribery or 
fraud is currently unclear. There are two strands of case law on this-----
one implying a wider extension of the concept of trust than the other. 
Also, not all common law systems are as conservative in their 
approach to this area as is English law proper.9 
Until recently, under English law, it was generally understood 
that a defrauded principal who is the victim of embezzlement or 
whose employee has accepted a bribe, would qualify as the beneficial 
owner of the traceable proceeds of corruption. As such, he can 
exercise his right against the person holding legal title and claim back 
his property. The concept of what constitutes property in situations 
where a proprietary claim can be asserted is very wide and includes 
assets that may never have been part of the estate of the victim. The 
fact that embezzled state funds would qualify as state property, and 
therefore subject to a proprietary claim, may be easily understood-----
the funds in question (provided they can be traced10) after all were 
once part of the assets of the state.11 However the notion of what may 
be recovered stretches further than that. Even a bribe paid to an 
official in furtherance of obtaining a certain contract could qualify as 
property to which the state holds beneficial title12-----and thus the state 
could vindicate, as beneficial owner, the repayment of that bribe.  
Since the defrauded principal is considered the owner of the stolen 
property, his claim extends not only to the property in question but 
also to any profits that may have derived from it. In addition, it not 
only extends to the property itself but also to any substitute assets 
into which the original property may have been converted. The 
beneficial interest of the defrauded principal remains attached to the 
asset along the way. It is here that the uniquely common law concept 
of ‘‘tracing’’ becomes relevant.13 Tracing is the process:  
9. For instance, U.S. and Canadian courts recognize the so-called 
‘‘remedial’’ constructive trusts, while English courts do not. Under a 
remedial constructive trust, the court has jurisdiction to declare 
property held by a defendant to be beneficially owned by a claimant 
where to find otherwise would be ‘‘unconscionable.’’ 
10. See UNCAC, supra note 3, art. 31(2). 
11. See e.g., Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal 
Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993, 1003−06 (2008) (explaining why 
and how a victim of embezzlement has a relative proprietary claim 
under tracing, contract, and property principles).  
12. See, e.g., Attorney General of H.K. v Reid [1993] UKPC 36, 38 (P.C.) 
(N.Z.).  
13. Unique in a private civil law context, that is. For criminal confiscation, 
civil law jurisdictions do allow for tracing of assets-----the following 
proceeds of crime through their different forms.  
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[B]y which a claimant demonstrates what has happened to his 
property, identifies its proceeds and the persons who have 
handled or received them, and justifies his claim that the 
proceeds can properly be regarded as representing his property. 
Tracing is also distinct from claiming. It identifies the traceable 
proceeds of the claimant’s property. It enables the claimant to 
substitute the traceable proceeds for the original asset as the 
subject matter of his claim.14  
The holder of the beneficial interest can follow this trail and 
exercise his claim even where there have been numerous successive 
transactions. His interest binds everyone who takes the property or its 
traceable proceeds except a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice of the breach of trust.  
For example, in Attorney General v. Reid, Charles Warwick Reid, 
a lawyer from New Zealand, arrived in Hong Kong to join the 
Attorney General’s Chambers in 1975 and eventually worked his way 
up to Principal Crown Counsel and the head of Hong Kong’s 
Commercial Crime Unit.15 By 1989, he had acquired control of assets 
amounting to roughly HK $12.4 million, inexplicably and 
disproportionate to his earnings. In October 1989, Reid was suspended 
from duty and arrested by Hong Kong’s Independent Counsel Against 
Corruption on suspicion of corruption.16 
The Attorney General of Hong Kong fought a precedent-setting 
battle all the way up to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in London in order to recover the portions of approximately HK $12.4 
million of bribe money that had been converted into property after 
passing through various corporate vehicles and legal owners in New 
Zealand on Reid’s behalf. The issue at stake was that the Government 
of Hong Kong maintained that it held a registrable interest in the 
Reid-owned real properties in New Zealand, as they represented the 
proceeds of bribery while Reid was in dereliction of his fiduciary 
duties as a civil servant.17 The Privy Council judgment took for 
granted that the New Zealand properties were purchased with Reid’s 
bribe money. 
The Privy Council determined that the assets received by Reid as 
bribe payments should have been ‘‘paid or transferred instanter to the 
person who suffered from the breach of duty.’’18 This point is of great 
14. See Foskett v. McKeown and Others, [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (H.L.) (Eng.) 
(describing tracing as ‘‘neither a claim nor a remedy’’ but as merely a 
‘‘process’’).  
15. See Reid, [1993] UKPC at 36.  
16. See id.  
17. See id. (discussing that Hong Kong seeks to register caveats against the 
three properties in New Zealand). 
18. Id. 
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significance to the legal relationship held between the bribe-receiving 
fiduciary and the party whose trust has been betrayed; it provides the 
promise of a meaningful means of redress. Due to the Privy Council 
ruling, English common law (and many other legal systems) 
recognized that property acquired-----either innocently or criminally-----
in breach of trust belongs in equity to the cestui que trust (i.e., the 
beneficiary). In other words, persons holding such property do so 
constructively on trust for the true owner.19 It also held that if the 
value of the property representing the bribe depreciated, the fiduciary 
had to pay the injured person the difference between that value and 
the initial amount of the bribe.20 If the property increased in value, 
the fiduciary was not entitled to retain the excess since equity would 
not allow him to make any profit from his breach of duty. While not 
without its controversies, in many English speaking locales the 
Constructive Trust Doctrine is now a useful tool for those who seek to 
prevent the dispersal of corrupt funds and recover the proceeds of 
corrupt activities, such as bribery. 
Similarly, in Kartika Ratna Thahir v. Pertamina, Pertamina, an 
Indonesian state-owned enterprise whose principal business was the 
exploration, processing, and marketing of oil and natural gas, sought 
to recover bribes paid to Pertamina executive Haji Tharir by two 
contractors hoping for better contractual terms and preferential 
treatment.21 The bribes were deposited by the executive into a bank 
in Singapore.22 In determining whether Pertamina had a proprietary 
claim on the funds in the account, the court found that Thahir owed 
a fiduciary duty to Pertamina and that the bribes received by him 
were held as a constructive trustee for Pertamina, meaning Pertamina 
held a proprietary claim to the funds.23 
However, as indicated, it is not clear now whether the concept of 
constructive trust is still to be interpreted so extensively. A court 
decision rendered just two years ago has cast doubt on the more 
extensive use of the constructive trust doctrine as laid out above. In 
essence, Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Finance 
Ltd., drawing on old case law from the English Court of Appeal, 
makes a distinction between a fiduciary enriching himself by depriving 
a claimant of an asset (in which case there is a constructive trust) and 
19. There are limitations imposed on this idea to protect innocent third 
party holders of property who have given value without notice of the 
underlying breach of trust. 
20. See Reid, [1993] UKPC 36. 
21. See Thahir v. Pertamina, [1994] 3 SLR 257, [2]--[3] (Sing.) (discussing 
that bribes were paid and deposited into the bank in favor of Haji 
Thahir, who was employed by Pertamina). 
22. See id. at [46]. 
23. See id. at [57]. 
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a fiduciary enriching himself by doing wrong to a claimant (in which 
case there is not). The Sinclair case concerned breaches of fiduciary 
duty by an individual, Mr. Cushnie, who solicited funds from 
investors and others.24 The individual investors’ money was invested 
in a BVI company controlled by Mr. Cushnie called Trading Partners 
Limited (TPL).25 TPL held the funds on an express trust for the 
investors to use it to acquire title to factored trade receivables. TPL 
applied that money illegitimately to various fraudulent activities 
including passing the money to a company called Versailles Trade 
Finance (VTF), another of Mr. Cushnie’s vehicles, in order to 
artificially inflate the share price of VTF’s holding company, 
Versailles Group PLC (VGP).26 Mr. Cushnie sold part of his shares in 
VGP for millions, but joint administrative receivers were appointed 
over VGP and VTF shortly thereafter at the insistence of the banks.27 
Sinclair (an investor), on behalf of TPL, brought proceedings 
asserting a proprietary right over the proceeds of Mr. Cushnie’s sale 
of his shares in VGP on the basis that the proceeds were held in 
constructive trust for TPL as a result of Mr. Cushnie’s breach of his 
fiduciary duties.28 The importance in this context of ensuring a 
proprietary right over the proceeds was that given the insolvency of 
VGP, TPL ranked first amongst a number of creditors with claims to 
VTF/VGP’s assets. 
The English courts considered the legal principles applicable to 
the case as if the proceeds were bribes.29 The Court of Appeal held 
that a beneficiary of a fiduciary duty, in principle, cannot claim a 
proprietary interest in respect of an asset (e.g., bribes or secret profit) 
acquired in breach of such duties unless:  
1. The asset is or has been beneficially the property of the 
principal; or  
2. The agent acquired the asset by taking advantage of an 
opportunity or right which was properly that of the 
principal.30  
24. Sinclair Investments (U.K.) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Finance Ltd., [2010] 
EWHC 1614, [3], [10], [17] (Eng.). 
25. Id. at [5]. 
26. See id. at [8]. 
27. See id. at [14]. 
28. See id. at [18]. 
29. See id. at [33]--[34], [37]--[38] (citing to former cases making a distinction 
between receiving profits as bribes as opposed to profits from other 
means). 
30. See id. at [72]--[74]. 
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In relation to secret profit or bribes, the Court of Appeal held 
that the claimant is entitled to an equitable account rather than a 
proprietary interest and declined to follow the Privy Council’s 
decision in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Reid in this regard.31  
The story does not end there however, and the principle has once 
again become unclear as a result of the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
FHR European Ventures LLP v. Mankarious. Monte Carlo Grand 
Hotel Ltd (MCG) owned the share capital of Monte Carlo Grand 
Hotel SAM, which owned the Monte Carlo Grand Hotel in Monaco. 
MCG entered into a brokerage agreement with an agent, Mr. 
Mankarious, acting through Cedar Capital Partners, on behalf of a 
consortium of purchasers to sell the hotel in return for a fee of €10 
million once the deal was completed.32 The consortium bought the 
hotel for €211.5 million but was unaware that the agent had received 
a commission of €10 million. The consortium sued the agent for the 
amount of the payment he received from MCG.33 
The Court of Appeal held that the consortium had a proprietary 
remedy as a result of the agent’s breach of his fiduciary duty. The 
Court of Appeal held this case was a category two case (pursuant to 
Sinclair) and therefore made in exploitation of an opportunity that 
was rightfully the beneficiary’s.34 But the judgment in Sinclair on its 
face appeared to have decided that bribes and secret commissions 
would not give rise to proprietary remedies. The Court of Appeal 
noted that the decision ‘‘throws into clear relief . . . the very 
considerable difficulties inherent in the analysis in Sinclair 
Investments. . . . This has made the law more complex and uncertain 
and dependent on very fine factual distinctions.’’35 The Court of 
Appeal suggested that if Parliament does not clarify the law, then 
only the Supreme Court can provide a coherent and logical legal 
framework.36  
Thus, until such time as the position is clarified by the Supreme 
Court or Parliament, whether under English law secret commissions 
or bribes are recoverable on a proprietary basis will be largely 
dependent on the particular facts of the case. The English Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Sinclair however, has had no impact on the law 
of Hong Kong or of many other British Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
What is uncontroversial however is that where there is a clear prior 
31. See id. at [75]. 
32. FHR European Ventures LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA 17, [2], [5] 
(Eng.). 
33. See id. at [5], [12]. 
34. See id. at [83], [116]. 
35. Id. at [116]. 
36. See id. 
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proprietary right to assets and a defendant disposes of those assets in 
breach of a fiduciary duty, a constructive trust can be imposed on the 
proceeds of this particular form of corruption.  
For example, in State of Libya v. Capitana Seas Ltd., the state of 
Libya sought to obtain ownership of a house in London belonging to 
Capitana Seas Limited, a company ultimately controlled by Saadi 
Qaddafi, the son of the former ruler of Libya, Muammer Qaddafi. The 
judge found that he had used state funds to obtain the property and 
ruled:  
I am satisfied, on the evidence which has been put before me, 
that Saadi Quaddafi is the sole ultimate beneficial owner of the 
Defendant company [and that] the property was wrongfully and 
unlawfully purchased with funds belonging to the Claimant. In 
those circumstances, the beneficial interest in the property is 
held by the Defendant, for the Claimant, as constructive 
trustees.37 
In the above cases, fiduciary duty is defined very widely:  
[A] ‘fiduciary relation’ exists (a) whenever the plaintiff entrusts 
to the defendant property, including intangible property as, for 
instance, confidential information, and relies on the defendant 
to deal with such property for the benefit of the plaintiff or for 
the purposes authorized by him, and not otherwise . . . and (b) 
whenever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to be 
performed, for instance, the negotiation of a contract on his 
behalf or for his benefit and relies on the defendant to procure 
for the plaintiff the best terms available. . . .38  
It may, as in some of the examples above, give rise to a 
constructive trust and thus to a proprietary claim, or it may also 
provide a basis for personal claims.39 
2. Revendication 
As noted earlier, the concept of trust is not known by the civilian 
legal tradition of continental Europe and consequently there is no way 
in which a victim can exercise his rights as a beneficial owner of an 
asset held in constructive trust as discussed above. Most civil law 
systems do, however, provide for an action to claim back one’s 
property as the owner of that property (in French ‘‘action en 
revendication’’ and in German ‘‘Vindikationsklage’’) that can be 
37. Muammar el-Qaddafi/Saadi Quaddafi/London Mansion Case, STOLEN 
ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, THE WORLD BANK, http://star.worldbank 
.org/corruption-cases/node/19587 (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
38. Reading v. Attorney General, [1951] A.C. 507 (H.L.).  
39. See discussion supra Part II(A)(1).  
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exercised against anyone holding that property-----though exceptions 
for bona fide acquirers in certain circumstances may apply. However, 
those actions tend to be limited in scope to the return of the thing 
(res) itself (i.e., there is no tracing of the asset through changes in its 
original form) and are sometimes limited in time and do not typically 
extend to profits generated by the asset.40 Typically, money as such 
cannot be the subject of a proprietary action under civil law. As one 
writer noted: 
It is almost an axiom of civil law [countries] that money lacks 
‘‘droit de suite’’ and ‘‘droit de preference.’’ In whatever way 
money has passed hands, the person who holds title, has, at 
best, a personal action, not a real one, and thus does not have 
the position of a ‘‘separatist’’ in case of bankruptcy. . . .41  
While as a general rule that may be the case, there are some cases 
stretching these limits. In a recent court decision in Quebec,42 a judge 
ruled that provided that a sum of money could be clearly identified, a 
real action was available to the claimant. In this case, a party who 
was the owner of a claim against a third party that had been executed 
and the proceeds of which were held by the Receiver General of 
Quebec, sought to revendicate the amount of those funds plus 
interest,43 seeking application of articles 912 and 953 of the Civil Code 
of Quebec: 
912. The holder of a right of ownership or other real right may 
take legal action to have his right acknowledged. . . . 
953. The owner of property has a right to revendicate it against 
the possessor or the person detaining it without right, and 
40. This is not true for all civil law systems, for example in German law.  
41. See E.J.H. SCHRAGE E.A. (RED) DE ROL VAN GELD IN HET PRIVAATRECHT 
SYMPOSIUM OVER RECHT EN GELD 13 (2004) (translation by author). 
42. Saroglou v. Canada (Receiver General), 2012 QCCS 602 (Can.). It is 
acknowledged that the legal system of Quebec is mixed common and 
civil law. The civil (private) law of Quebec was once generally 
considered to be civil law in nature, whereas public and criminal law 
was considered to operate according to Common law rules of 
construction of statutes because Canada is a federal state and natural 
laws are supposed to be applied uniformly under rules established by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. However, things are changing. Quebec courts 
have begun to adopt purely common law inventions like the Mareva (or 
freeze order) injunction or the Anton Piller order (or private search and 
seizure order). 
43. Id. 
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may object to any encroachment or to any use not 
authorized by him or by law.44 
In determining whether a revendication action can be instituted 
for a sum of money, the judge agreed with previous case law that, 
‘‘Money is a fungible asset, to be able to revendicate title to it, it 
should be clearly identifiable. It is not sufficient that it be [merely] 
quantifiable’’45 and concluded that ‘‘[i]t appears, therefore, that for an 
action in revendication to lie in regard to a sum of money, certain 
factual proof must be made concerning the type of accounting and 
deposit that has been used,’’46 thus making it clear that there is no 
principled basis to object to a revendication action for funds-----
provided they are identifiable.47 
Now while there is thus some marginal precedent for a proprietary 
action to claim back funds under the civil law tradition, it is in no 
way as well developed as the constructive trust doctrine under the 
branch of common law known as equity. Also there is certainly no 
precedent for any claim of profits generated with the funds in 
question. Proprietary claims and remedies will not be available in all 
cases. For instance they may not be available in the absence of a 
breach of fiduciary duty. A bank has no proprietary claim under 
English law to the proceeds of an armed bank robbery, because a 
bank robber is in no way an agent of the victim bank.  Equally, some 
commentators claim that if the proceeds of an abuse of power cannot 
be traced because they have been successfully laundered so as to 
render it impossible to demonstrate a link between the original funds 
and the funds ultimately identified in the defendant’s estate, a 
proprietary claim will fail. In that case recourse will have to be made 
to a personal claim against persons holding the assets in question or 
those who have participated in the corrupt act or the ensuing money 
laundering. However, this understates the rules of equitable 
proprietary tracing. Tracing is not limited to ‘‘following’’ the proceeds 
of corruption in the physical sense. The law of tracing provides a 
series of rules of presumption and shifting burdens of proof to allow a 
judge to decide who may be the true owner of a property. For 
instance, equity (which is, again, the branch of the common law we 
are concerned with) says that if a dishonest agent has mixed his 
44. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 912, 953 (Can.). 
45. Saroglou, 2012 QCCS 602, ¶ 44 (translating Justice Clément Gascon’s 
comment). 
46. Id. ¶ 47.  
47. Since in the current case the judge could not determine whether the 
funds had in fact been intermingled with other funds, he did not 
pronounce a final ruling but sent it back to the judge seized of the 
merits of the case. 
628 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
Using Civil Remedies in Corruption and Asset Recovery Cases 
principal’s assets with those of his own, he is presumed to have 
dissipated his personal assets first-----leaving any remainder deemed to 
belong to his principal. Moreover, an agent can be sued for an 
accounting of his use of his principal’s funds.  If he fails to account for 
what he has done with his principal’s property, (a) he is liable 
personally to restore the same on the basis of an equitable damages 
award, and (b) what property remains under his control can be 
impressed with an equitable charge or lien. 
B. Personal Claims  
We will now turn to an examination of the ways in which a 
victim of corruption can recover damages from a defendant based on a 
personal claim sounded in breach of contract, tort, or unjust 
enrichment. Damages are generally understood as ‘‘[m]oney claimed 
by, or ordered to be paid to a person as compensation for loss or 
injury.’’48 The object of awarding damages is to redress the monetary 
loss suffered by the victim as a result of an act or omission. The basic 
rule for the determination of damages in corruption cases provides 
that the victim must be placed as much as possible in the situation he 
would have been in but for the commission of the corrupt act. Thus, 
all expenses or lost profits caused by the corrupt act must be 
compensated.49 A plaintiff’s right to compensation may be reduced or 
disallowed in case he himself is found to be (contributorily) 
negligent.50 
In the current context, where a corrupt act has occurred, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate damage, the breach of a duty owed to the 
plaintiff by a defendant, and the causal link between the act and the 
damage.51 Apart from liability of those who directly initiated or 
48. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (9th ed. 2009). 
49. Compensation may cover material damage, loss of profits and non-
pecuniary loss. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, art. 3(2), Nov. 4, 
1999, E.T.S. No. 174 (entered into force Nov. 1, 2003). Section 38 of the 
Explanatory Report states that the material damage (damnum 
emergens) refers to the actual reduction in the economic situation of the 
person who has suffered the damage. The loss of profits (lucrum 
cessans) represents the profit that could reasonably have been expected 
but that was not gained because of the corrupt act. Id., Explanatory 
Report, art. 38.  
50. See, e.g., id. art. 6. 
51. For example, Article 4 of the Convention states:  
Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the following  
conditions to be fulfilled in order for the damage to be compensated:  
(i) the defendant has committed or authorised the act of 
corruption, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent 
the act of corruption; 
(ii) the plaintiff has suffered damage; and 
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committed the act in question (i.e., the donor and recipient of the 
bribe or the government official who embezzled funds), those who 
somehow facilitated the act (e.g., banks through which the funds have 
passed, lawyers whose clients’ accounts were used in transferring 
stolen assets, trust, and company service providers involved in the 
setting up and management of shell corporations) may, depending on 
the legal system, also be liable because they either dishonestly assisted 
a corrupt agent to breach his fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to his 
principal-----or were recklessly indifferent to obvious risks (or were 
guilty of ‘‘blind eye knowledge of the obvious’’), or were merely 
negligent in their due diligence concerning the origin of funds or the 
purpose of the transaction. However, it is rare when a legal system 
allows a third party (like a bank) to be successfully sued for 
negligently assisting in a fraud. Usually, no duty of care is said to 
exist to unforeseen or unknown third party victims, or the defendant 
hides behind contractual disclaimers of liability for negligence.  
1. Contract  
In certain cases of corruption there will be a contractual 
relationship between the harmed party and the perpetrator of the 
corrupt act. For bribery the situations that most readily jump to 
mind is of an employment contract between a principal (harmed 
party) and his agent (person receiving the bribe) or a contract for the 
performance of works between a state (harmed party) and a private 
company (person paying the bribe).52 Where embezzlement is 
concerned, the embezzler will often be in some way employed, or 
performing certain services for the harmed party. The question then is 
to what extent that contractual relationship can provide the basis for 
an action for breach of contract and what sort of damages may be 
awarded as a result. In some cases even a third party beneficiary from 
a contract can seek to recover damages.  
Under the UN Oil for Food Program (OFFP), the UN Security 
Council established a vehicle for the sale and lifting of Iraqi crude oil 
(iii) there is a causal link between the act of corruption and 
the damage. 
Id. art. 4(1). 
52. The bribe contract itself is, of course, invalid ob turpem causam. Cf. 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, art. 8 (‘‘Each party 
shall provide in its internal law for any contract or clause of a contract 
providing for corruption to be null and void.’’). This is also the rule in 
the list of transnational principles, which states ‘‘[c]ontracts based on or 
involving the payment or transfer of bribes (‘corruption money’, ‘secret 
commissions’, ‘pots-de-vin’, ‘kickbacks’) are void.’’ Center of 
Transnational Law, No. IV.7.2(a) Invalidity of Contract Due to Bribery, 
TRANS-LEX, http://www.trans-lex.org/output.php?docid=938000 (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
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and for direct financial transactions with the Iraqi regime.53 The 
resolution establishing the OFFP, UN Security Council Resolution 
986, permitted the regime to sell Iraqi oil under strict conditions 
designed to ensure that the proceeds were used for humanitarian 
goods and for the benefit of the Iraqi people.54 An escrow account was 
established at BNP New York in Manhattan, to receive the proceeds 
of the oil sales and to pay for the humanitarian goods.55 The UN and 
BNP executed an agreement for banking services that governed the 
management of the escrow account.56 In 2008 the Republic of Iraq 
filed a suit with the U.S. District Court in New York, which is still 
ongoing.57 
In its claim, the Republic of Iraq asserts that the sole purpose of 
the agreement was to protect the interest of the Republic and the 
Iraqi people from corrupt and wrongful intentions of the Iraqi 
regime.58 It argues that, among other things, BNP did not disclose 
that intermediaries were involved in the sale of oil-----which is a 
relevant fact since the presence of an intermediary almost always 
means the seller (Iraq in this case) is not getting full market value 
since the intermediary gets part of the gain.59 In so doing, it thus 
furthered its own commercial interests and that of its commercial 
53. See About the Programme, UN OFFICE FOR THE IRAQ PROGRAMME OIL-
FOR-FOOD, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html (last 
updated Nov. 4, 2003). 
54. Id. (stating that the program was intended to be ‘‘a temporary measure 
to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, until the 
fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions’’). 
55. Iraq (Oil-for-Food), SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Apr. 30, 2008), 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2008-
05/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_4065745.php (stating that the 
majority of revenue from this program was held in escrow for the 
purchase of related items like food, medicine, housing, oil production, 
sanitation, etc.) 
56. See id. 
57. Patricia Hurtado, ABB Wins Dismissal of Suit over Hussein Oil-Food 
Program, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.bloomber 
g.com/news/2013-02-06/abb-wins-dismissal-of-suit-over-hussein-oil-food-
program.html (describing the district court’s dismissal because Iraq 
cannot recover for wrongdoing and actions that occurred outside the 
United States). 
58. See generally Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, No. 08 Civ. 5951(SHS), 2013 
WL 441959 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2013) (describing the overall litigation, 
the Iraqi issues raised in the suit, and the initial purpose of the program 
being to continue Iraq’s economic isolation while relieving the suffering 
of the Iraqi people caused by those sanctions). 
59. See id. at 5 (explaining how Chevron would pay intermediaries a 
premium above the official selling price that would be paid as a 
surcharge to the Hussein Regime). 
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customers-----purchasers of oil-----to the detriment of the Iraqi people. In 
addition the Republic of Iraq claimed that BNP breached the terms of 
Resolution 986, which was incorporated into the agreement and which 
required full transparency of each transaction.60 It did so by 
concealing material information from its disclosures to the UN, 
including information on actual purchasers of oil and the fact that 
surcharges were being paid.61 Thus, according to the claim, BNP 
breached the banking agreement through negligence and intentional 
conduct, and the Republic of Iraq, as a third party beneficiary of the 
contract, should therefore be entitled to recover its actual damages 
from them.  
Remedies for invalidity or breach of contract will generally 
include monetary damages. The absolute invalidity of a contract 
made for an unlawful purpose is based on the social harm of 
corruption and the violation of general moral principles rather than 
on the harm to the aggrieved party (the harm would be an argument 
for a ‘‘voidable’’-----as opposed to a void-----contract). In that case the 
principal could be left completely without counter-performance. He, 
however, may wish to enforce the contract (e.g., because execution is 
already too far advanced). In that case his damages may consist of his 
paying too much for the contract (because the contract partner 
included the bribe in his calculations). Rescission or annulment of 
contract is also possible, particularly in cases of bribery and collusion 
in bidding.62 Article 34 of UNCAC states that, ‘‘States Parties may 
consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or 
rescind a contract.’’63 
The World Duty Free Limited case highlights the void and 
voidable distinction. In April 1989, the Government of Kenya 
concluded an agreement with the company ‘‘House of Perfume’’ for 
the construction, maintenance, and operation of duty-free complexes 
in two of the country’s airports.64 The ‘‘World Duty Free Limited’’ 
company replaced the ‘‘House of Perfume’’ in May 1990 with an 
60. See id. at 2 (noting that the resolution required Iraq to submit to the 
Secretary General a plan of distribution and confirmation that the 
humanitarian goods arrived in Iraq). 
61. Id. at 4--5. 
62. Cf. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, art. 8(2) 
(‘‘Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility for all 
parties to a contract whose consent has been undermined by an act of 
corruption to be able to apply to the court for the contract to be 
declared void, notwithstanding their right to claim for damages.’’). 
63. UNCAC, supra note 3, art. 34, at 26; see also Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption, supra note 49, art. 8(2) 
64. World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, ¶ 62 (Oct. 4, 2006). 
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amendment to the agreement.65 In August 1995, a lease was concluded 
between the Kenya Airports Authority and World Duty Free. Mr. 
Nassir Ibrahim Ali signed these contracts on behalf of the 
companies.66  
On June 16, 2000, World Duty Free Limited requested arbitration 
of a dispute before the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. World Duty Free contended that Kenya had 
breached the 1989 agreement by illegally expropriating its properties 
and destroying its rights under the agreement.67 Kenya, on the other 
hand, argued that the agreement was procured through the payment 
of a bribe to Kenya’s then-President Daniel Arap Moi. Hence, it 
claimed that it was unenforceable as a matter of public policy.68 
The Tribunal first considered whether Mr. Ali had paid a bribe to 
President Moi and whether the agreement had been procured as a 
result of a bribe. It then examined the consequences of the bribe on 
the validity and enforceability of the agreement under both public 
policy and applicable laws.69 The Tribunal found that the payments 
by Mr. Ali on behalf of the House of Perfume to President Moi were 
bribes that were given in order to obtain the 1989 agreement.70 The 
Tribunal highlighted that bribery is contrary to the international 
public policy of most, if not all, states. Thus, it concluded that claims 
based on contracts of corruption or on contracts obtained by 
corruption could not be upheld by it.71 Citing Lord Mustill’s legal 
opinion,72 the Tribunal accepted that there is a distinction between 
contracts which are void and those which are voidable. A void 
contract is the one that is so defective ‘‘as to make it entirely 
ineffectual in the eyes of the law. It is from the outset empty of 
content.’’73 In contrast, a voidable contract is intrinsically valid and 
the injured party ‘‘has the option of rescinding the contract, declaring 
itself free from further obligations, and if necessary going to the court 
to obtain a decree to that effect.’’74  
Although in practice the outcome is often the same, there are 
some differences. Where a contract is void, no action is required to 
65. Id. ¶ 63. 
66. Id. ¶ 126. 
67. Id. ¶¶ 4, 127. 
68. Id. ¶ 128. 
69. Id. ¶ 129. 
70. Id. ¶ 136. 
71. Id. ¶ 157. 
72. Id. ¶¶ 163--64. 
73. Id. ¶ 164. 
74. Id. 
633 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
Using Civil Remedies in Corruption and Asset Recovery Cases 
expunge it since its failure is an ‘‘automatic’’ consequence. By 
contrast, where a contract is voidable, the injured party must take a 
positive action to set it aside. According to the Tribunal, ‘‘Corruption 
of a state officer by bribery is synonymous with the most heinous 
crimes because it can cause huge economic damage: its long-term 
victims can be legion.’’75 Therefore, like any other contract, a state 
contract procured by bribing a state officer is legally unenforceable 
‘‘as an affront to the public conscience.’’76 The Court concluded that 
with regards to public policy both under English and Kenyan law, 
World Duty Free was not legally entitled to maintain any of its 
claims. It also added that Kenya was legally entitled to avoid the 
agreement and that it had not lost its right to avoid it by 
affirmation.77 The Court also noted the disturbing fact that Kenya 
had not yet taken any actions to prosecute its former president for 
corruption or to recover the bribe in civil proceedings.78  
Depending on the legal system, avoidance can be either 
retroactive or limited to the application of the contract in the future. 
Counter-performance and expenses incurred by the contractor-----for 
example, having to redo a tender process or negotiating a new 
contract-----may then also qualify as damages. Under certain 
circumstances any profits can also be disgorged. Though in principle 
damages are measured by the plaintiff’s loss, not the defendant’s gain, 
it is clear that no one can be allowed to profit from a contractual 
breach where that breach constitutes a wrong. ‘‘In a suitable case the 
damages for breach of contract may be measured by the benefit 
gained by the wrongdoer from the breach.’’79  
In Attorney General v. Blake,80 Blake was a member of the United 
Kingdom’s intelligence service. When he joined MI-6, Blake ‘‘expressly 
agreed in writing that he would not disclose official information, 
during or after his service, in book form or otherwise. He was 
employed on that basis.’’81 In 1990 he published his autobiography No 
Other Choice,82 in which he disclosed a great deal of information 
covered by the provision in his contract. The court ruled that, even 
though the Crown had suffered no damages from Blake’s disclosures, 
75. Id. ¶ 173. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. ¶ 188. 
78. Id. ¶ 180. 
79. Attorney General v. Blake, [2000] UKHL 45 (Eng.). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. GEORGE BLAKE, NO OTHER CHOICE (1990). 
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the profits gained from the publication of the book were to be paid to 
the Untied Kingdom as his employer.83 The court stated:  
In considering what would be a just response to a breach of 
Blake’s undertaking the court has to take these considerations 
into account. The undertaking, if not a fiduciary obligation, was 
closely akin to a fiduciary obligation, where an account of 
profits is a standard remedy in the event of breach. Had the 
information which Blake has now disclosed still been 
confidential, an account of profits would have been ordered, 
almost as a matter of course. In the special circumstances of the 
intelligence services, the same conclusion should follow even 
though the information is no longer confidential. That would be 
a just response to the breach. I am reinforced in this view by 
noting that most of the profits from the book derive indirectly 
from the extremely serious and damaging breaches of the same 
undertaking committed by Blake in the 1950s. As already 
mentioned, but for his notoriety as an infamous spy his 
autobiography would not have commanded royalties of the 
magnitude Jonathan Cape [the publisher] agreed to pay.84 
Disgorgement of profits is sometimes referred to by the somewhat 
‘‘unhappy’’85 term of restitution. Its objective is to divest the 
defendant of the benefit he received and prevent unjust enrichment.86 
According to the principle of ‘‘unjust enrichment,’’ one person should 
not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, 
but should be required to make restitution for property or benefits 
unjustly received. Disgorgement is the forced giving up of illegally 
obtained profits.  
Pursuant to Article 423 of the Swiss Law on Obligations (agency 
in the interest of the agent ‘‘gestion imparfaite’’), where agency 
activities were not carried out with the best interests of the principal 
in mind, the principal is entitled to appropriate any resulting 
benefits.87 The conditions for application of this article are fourfold: 
(a) a profit (b) caused by (c) an act of interference (d) attributable to 
an agent acting in bad faith. Clearly a bribe would qualify as a profit 
and thus the article would entitle the principal to reclaim any bribes 
from his agent. It is a question of debate whether this would also 
cover the benefit that the corrupting contractual party derives from 
83. Blake, [2000] UKHL 45. 
84. Id. 
85. See Blake, [2000] UKHL 45 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead). 
86. DONALD HARRIS, DAVID CAMPBELL & ROGER HALSON, REMEDIES IN 
CONTRACT AND TORT 231 (2d ed. 2005).  
87. CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [CO] [Code of Obligations] March 30, 1911, art. 
423 (Switz). 
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the contract (e.g., the net profit made on the contract). Depending on 
what rights one deems protected by the article, such profits may be 
covered. A large conception of what rights are at stake (and thus 
whether an infringement on that right would constitute an act of 
interference) would allow for an action based on this article against 
the corrupting contracting party.88  
Quite apart from that, Article 9 of the federal law on unfair 
competition states that whoever, through an act of unfair competition 
(which includes bribery), suffers or is likely to suffer prejudice to his 
business or his economic interests in general, may require the 
surrender of profits in accordance with the provisions on agency 
without authority.89 Whilst a logical consequence of the maxim that 
no one can profit by his own wrong, the disgorgement of profits is not 
punitive in character-----for that there is the criminal law. Still, the 
possibility of taking away profits gained through an act of corruption 
may also have a preventive effect on perpetrators of corruption.  
Depending on the legal system, it can be possible to successfully 
submit a claim cumulatively both for damages suffered by the 
plaintiff and the disgorgement of profits made by the defendant. Thus 
a state that is the victim of bribery may be able to both claim the 
profits that a party made as a result of the bribe and the damages 
that it suffered as a result (e.g., because the execution of the contract 
was faulty or because a new tender process had to be initiated). Quite 
apart from that, certain courts, mainly in the common law world (in 
particular in the United States), can also impose punitive damages on 
the perpetrator, the effect of which is, as the name suggests, to punish 
the perpetrator. The possibility of such damages clearly does have a 
preventive effect:  
An award of punitive damages expresses the community’s 
abhorrence at the defendant’s act. We understand that 
otherwise upright, decent, law-abiding people are sometimes 
careless and that their carelessness can result in unintentional 
injury for which compensation should be required. We react far 
more strongly to the deliberate or reckless wrongdoer, and an 
award of punitive damages commutes our indignation into a 
kind of civil fine, civil punishment. Some of these functions are 
also performed by the criminal justice system.90  
88. See Christine Chappuis La Restitutions des Profits Issue de la 
Corruption: Quels Moyens en Droit Prive?, in Lutte Contre La 
Corruption-----The Never Ending Story (Bernard Bertossa et al. eds., 
2011). 
89. LOI FÉDÉRALE CONTRE LA CONCURRENCE DÉLOYALE [LCD] [Law on 
Unfair Competition] Dec. 19, 1986, art. 9 [Switz.]. 
90. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996).  
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Indeed civil law countries tend not to have the concept of punitive 
damages partly for that reason: they consider punishment to be the 
realm of criminal, not civil, law. 
2. Tort  
A tort is an act or an omission that causes damage to another 
person that constitutes a legal ground for the payment of damages to 
the person wronged by the person to whom the act or omission may 
be attributed.91 Damages compensate a plaintiff for loss, injury, or 
harm directly caused by a breach of duty, including criminal 
wrongdoing, immoral conduct, or pre-contractual fault by the 
tortfeasor.92  
In bribery cases, since both parties to the bribery act wrongfully 
towards the principal, courts have held that both the recipient and 
the donor of the bribe committed a joint tort and thus the victim is 
entitled to recover from either party. To be clear: such joint liability 
does not mean that a victim could recover twice.  
It is impossible to give a complete overview of the types of acts 
that may qualify as a civil wrong. 
In the context of corruption cases, civil fraud, tortious 
interference, conspiracy, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, or 
breach of agency duty(giving rise to, among other things, claims for 
an accounting for the use and application of a principal’s property) , 
as well as abuse of power in office are all relevant causes of action. In 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty cases, equitable damages will often 
be available to remedy any impossibility to trace assets.  
In one illustrative case, the Republic of Korea wished to purchase 
military equipment and solicited competing bids from manufacturers. 
Plaintiff Korea Supply Company (KSC) represented one of the 
manufacturers, MacDonald Dettwiler, and stood to receive a 
commission of over $30 million if the contract was awarded to that 
manufacturer.93 Ultimately, the contract was awarded to Loral (now 
Lockheed Martin Tactical Systems).94 KSC contended that even 
though MacDonald Dettwiler’s bid was lower and its equipment 
superior, it was not awarded the contract because Loral Corporation 
91. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009). A tort is ‘‘[a] civil 
wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be 
obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law 
imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.’’ 
Id. 
92. See id. at 445 (damage relates ‘‘to monetary compensation for loss or 
injury to a person or property’’).  
93. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 941 (Cal. 
2003). 
94. Id. 
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and its agent had offered bribes and sexual favors to key Korean 
officials.95 KSC instituted an action asserting (amongst others) a 
claim under the tort of interference with prospective economic 
advantage.96 Under the common law of the United States, the 
elements for a successful action are:  
(1) An economic relationship between the plaintiff and some 
third party, with the probability of future economic benefit 
to the plaintiff;  
(2) The defendant’s knowledge of the relationship;  
(3) Intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to 
disrupt the relationship;  
(4) Actual disruption of the relationship; and  
(5) Economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the 
acts of the defendant.97  
The Supreme Court of California found that all those conditions were 
met and hence KSC did have an action in tort against Loral 
(Lockheed). 
In another case, Misappropriation of Public Funds and Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty: The Case Against Frederick Chiluba and Others,98 
the Attorney General of Zambia (AGZ) for and on behalf of the 
Republic of Zambia claimed to recover sums which were transferred 
by the Ministry of Finance between 1995 and 2001. The money in 
question was transferred on the basis that it was required to pay 
debts owed by the government.99  
The case fell into three distinct parts, two of which are relevant 
here. The first arose out of the transfer of about U.S. $52 million from 
Zambia to a bank account operated outside ordinary governmental 
processes called the Zamtrop Account held at a bank in London (the 
Zamtrop Conspiracy).100 The other related to payments of about U.S. 
$20 million Zambia made pursuant to an alleged arms deal with 
Bulgaria and paid into accounts in Belgium and Switzerland, at least 
some of which funds found their way to London (the BK 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 942. 
97. Id. at 950.  
98. Attorney General of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai, [2007] EWHC (Ch) 
952 (Eng.). 
99. Id. at [1]. 
100. Id. at [2]. 
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Conspiracy).101 The Zamtrop Account was set up as part of the 
conspiracy to steal. It was operated under a special arrangement to 
hide what was going on and to inhibit legitimate queries.102 There was 
equally no legitimate basis for the payments out under the BK 
Conspiracy. There were no genuine arms sales to justify the payments 
nor would the Republic have entered into the arrangements it did if it 
had been properly advised.103 This too was merely a vehicle for their 
fraudulent removal of government money.  
The judge found former President Chiluba, his Permanent 
Secretary, and other high-ranking officials, to have conspired to 
misappropriate a headline figure of more than U.S. $25 million under 
the Zamtrop Conspiracy and more than U.S. $21 million under the 
BK Conspiracy and to have broken their fiduciary duties which they 
owed to the Republic or (for some of them) to have dishonestly 
assisted in such breaches.104  
3. Restitution and unjust enrichment 
Apart from tort and contract, unjust enrichment is a separate 
cause of action that gives rise to a claim against the person unjustly 
enriched. The focus of this action is on ‘‘re-establishing equality as 
between two parties as a response to a disruption of equilibrium. Its 
raison d’être is founded in the injustice that lies in one person’s 
retaining something which he or she ought not to retain, requiring 
that the scales be righted.’’105 There is no need to show that any loss 
was suffered. The elements for unjust enrichment are the receipt of a 
benefit and unjust retention thereof at the expense of another. Civil 
suits conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 
United States to claim disgorgement of proceeds in bribery cases are 
based on the concept of unjust enrichment. The ‘‘at the expense of 
another element’’ does not apply, however, when the plaintiff seeks 
restitution of secret profits generated by the fraud of a faithless agent. 
A public official is an agent and has an unqualified duty to make 
restitution of all secret profits.’’ 106  
101. Id. 
102. Id. at [82], [126]. 
103. Id. at [257]. 
104. Id. at [1120], [1132]. 
105. See Martin S. Kenney, The Fundamentals of a Civil Asset Recovery 
Action, in ASSET TRACING & RECOVERY, THE FRAUDNET WORLD 
COMPENDIUM 111, 125 (2009). 
106. See Michael A. Sachs & Leonard Gumport, Public Corruption: 
Maximizing Remedies (County Counsel’s Association of California 
Annual Conference paper, Sept. 14--15, 2005), available at 
http://www.grlegal.com/Articles/public_corruption_mem_7-11-06.pdf. 
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4. Civil action based on a criminal case 
A final word needs to be said on the concurrence of a civil claim 
with a criminal trial. The criminal act may provide the injured party 
with a civil remedy, separately actionable. Thus an act of bribery or 
corruption as a criminal offence may, under other legislation, provide 
the basis for civil liability.  
In the United States for example, if a person has violated the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), such an act may be the 
trigger for his civil liability towards those injured by his corrupt act, 
even though the FCPA itself does not provide potential claimants 
with a possibility of legal redress.107 An example of this is the 
situation in which shareholders of a company convicted of FCPA 
violations sue the officers and directors of the company for breaching 
their fiduciary duties towards the company, thus acting derivatively 
on behalf of the company. An FCPA violation can also function as a 
predicate act to bring a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, albeit in an indirect way.108 Finally U.S. 
federal or state antitrust laws may provide the basis for civil liability 
against those who violate the FCPA when there is proof that the act 
of corruption has a negative effect on competition between companies 
within the U.S. or the state).109 In the earlier quoted case of KSC v. 
Lockheed,110 the Supreme Court of California confirmed that an 
FCPA violation constitutes an act of unfair competition (which 
includes a fraudulent business act or practice) under California’s 
unfair competition law and thus triggers liability under that law.111 
In many civil law jurisdictions, the criminal procedure laws allow 
the victim that is harmed by an offense and has suffered damage to 
participate in a criminal case as a civil party. Thus, in addition to 
107. Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA Is No Private Matter, THE FCPA BLOG: 
THE WORLD’S LARGEST ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE PORTAL (Mar. 
2, 2008), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/3/3/the-fcpa-is-no-priva 
te-matter.html (stating that in the leading case addressing FCPA 
private right of action, Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., the Sixth Circuit 
could not ‘‘find anything in the FCPA giving private parties the right to 
enforce the law’’). 
108. Since FCPA is not listed as a predicate act in RICO, a violation of the 
federal Travel Act, which prohibits travel with intent to promote 
‘‘unlawful activity’’ (i.e., the FCPA violation), has to be proved to 
conclude a violation of RICO. See e.g., Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 
803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992); see also Edward W. Little, Use of the 
FCPA in State-Law Unfair Competition Cases, 19 BUS. TORTS LITIG., 
Fall 2011, at 4, available at http://www.mccarter.com/new/files/18278 
_little-reprint.pdf. 
109. See id. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 93--97. 
111. See Korea Supply, 63 P.3d at 953. 
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pursuing damages in the context of a separate civil litigation, the 
victim can join the criminal proceedings. The affected state must be 
aware of the ongoing foreign criminal investigation to be able to join 
the criminal proceedings as a civil party. The affected state’s claim for 
damages will be adjudicated within the criminal trial, and in some 
jurisdictions the country will not be obliged to bring a separate civil 
lawsuit. Becoming a civil party in criminal proceedings is usually 
faster, simpler, and less expensive. Also, it is possible to maintain 
frequent contact with the prosecutor and the investigating judge. 
There are only a few cases of foreign bribery where countries have 
participated as a partie civile parties in criminal proceedings.112 
For example, in 2007, Nigeria became a civil party in a money 
laundering case initiated in France against Dan Etete, the former 
Minister of Energy of Nigeria.113 Etete was convicted and received a 
suspended prison sentence.114 Nigeria as a civil party was awarded 
€150,000 for non-pecuniary damages.115 
A prior criminal conviction may, as we have seen, make it easier 
to establish the basis for civil liability. An acquittal will not, as a 
112. In France, according to Article 2 of the French Criminal Procedure 
Code, a party may obtain civil compensation from a criminal court 
when the party can show personal and direct damage resulting from the 
crime.  
113. See Biodon Omojola, Africa Oil and Gas Today: Bone in the Throat, 
AFRICA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.africatoday.com/cgi-bin/pub 
lic.cgi?sub=news&action=one&cat=177&id=2260. 
114. Id. 
115. Etete Has His Day in Court, AFRICAINTELLIGENCE.COM (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/oil/2009/03/25/etete-has-his-
day-in-court,58139822-ART-ignorevalide (providing a report on the 
arbitration process associated with the Etete money laundering case). 
There is of course also the interesting development of non-governmental 
organizations constituting themselves as partie civile and initiating 
investigations on corruption-----such as has happened in France, where 
the Court de Cassation ruled that Transparency International France 
had standing before the court to initiate an investigation against the 
ruling families of Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon for 
embezzlement of public funds, because the collective interest of the 
organization (the fight against corruption) was deemed at stake; or as 
happened in Spain when a Spanish NGO used the accion popular, 
according to which any Spanish citizen or NGO can bring a criminal 
action before an investigating magistrate, to file a complaint against 
family members and close associates of the President of Equatorial 
Guinea for the diversion of public funds to the purchase of real estate in 
Spain (money laundering). However, since that concerns rather the 
ability to initiate a criminal case rather than the ability to recover 
assets or damages this rather falls outside the scope of this article. For 
an interesting discussion on this see Maud Perdriel-Vassière, How to 
Turn Article 51 into Reality?, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN ASSET 
RECOVERY (Daniel Thelesklaf & Pedro Gomes Pereira eds., 2011). 
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legal matter, prevent a later civil claim. Common law jurisdictions 
have very different standards of proof between criminal and civil 
cases. In criminal cases, the standard is proof ‘‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’’ whereas for civil matters it tends to be ‘‘proof beyond a 
balance of probabilities.’’ While the prosecutor may not be able to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, for example, that, for instance, the 
defendant converted state property to his own use, the state as 
plaintiff in a private civil lawsuit may be able to prove such fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence-----that is to say that it was more likely 
than not-----that he converted that same property to his own use.  
Having thus given a brief overview of the possible causes of action 
upon which to frame a claim for compensation, we will now proceed 
to examine more closely how any monetary awards, based on those 
causes of action, might be calculated. 
III. REMEDIES: HOW MUCH TO SUE FOR AND HOW ARE 
THE DAMAGES CALCULATED? 
This section discusses various methods of calculating the value of 
assets or the amounts of damages to be sought in a civil lawsuit. 
Some methods of calculation overlap with methods used in similar 
criminal or other enforcement matters. 
A. Most Common Remedies Used to Quantify Illicit Profits, 
Compensation or Restitution 
When civil remedies are employed in asset recovery cases, issues 
arise with regards to the quantification of the proceeds or the 
financial consequences of corrupt activities. The approach taken to 
quantify the benefits or the damages generated by corruption depends 
on the type of remedy that is used in each particular case.116 A 
jurisdiction seeking the disgorgement of illicit profits will need to 
calculate the gains resulting from corruption; if it wants to be 
compensated for damages it will need to quantify the financial 
consequences of corrupt activities. And if it wants to avoid a contract 
awarded by a bribed official, it will calculate the monetary equivalent 
of contractual services. These remedies can ensure that the affected 
government will recover the financial consequences of corrupt 
activities. But making parties ‘‘even’’ does not guarantee deterrence. 
This is why other civil remedies including punitive damages and the 
calculation of a ‘‘social damage’’ are sometimes advocated as 
advancing the deterrence requirements of anticorruption policies.  
116. See OECD/The World Bank, Identification and Quantification of the 
Proceeds of Bribery: Revised Edition, 30 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264174801-en. 
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1. Disgorgement  
The starting point for calculating the benefits of corruption is to 
look at the gross or net revenues generated by the illicit contract. 
According to the gross revenue method, all revenues received 
under the contract obtained by bribery are considered proceeds or 
benefits of bribery and are subject to disgorgement.117 
According to the net proceeds method, the benefits subject to 
disgorgement are the contract revenues minus certain legitimate costs 
or expenses incurred by the briber in executing the contract-----for 
example the cost of supplying goods and services.118  
 
The additional profit method calculates the profits that would 
have been made if no bribery had occurred. Thus one would need to 
look at similar contracts where no bribery occurred to compare them 
to the contract involving bribery.120 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 31. 
120. Id. at 32--33. 
         Example of the net revenue method 
         (United States)119 
           Proceeds = Net revenues (gross revenues from    
       the contract minus costs/expenses) 
In the Sales of Goods and Services Case, in return for 
bribes amounting to U.S. $5 million, a company obtained 
projects to build communications networks and control systems 
for state-owned enterprises. The revenues from the projects were 
valued at U.S. $100 million. The company paid U.S. $25 million 
for the goods sold for the projects. The company also disguised 
the bribes as a legitimate expense in its books and records, and 
deducted the expense from its taxes. 
 
Calculating the Benefit 
 
The benefit subject to confiscation was calculated using 
the ‘‘net revenue’’ method: 
 
Revenues received from projects: U.S. $100,000,000 
----  Cost of goods sold for projects: U.S. $25,000,000 
+ Total amount of bribes paid: U.S. $5,000,000 
= Total benefit derived: U.S. $80,000,000 
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2. Compensation for damages  
The basic rule for the determination of damages is that the victim 
must be placed as much as possible in the circumstances in which he 
or she would have been but for the bribe. In the case of government 
contracts, damages caused by bribery are often the same as increased 
profits gained by the contractor. Under this method, courts may have 
to estimate the difference between the price or the quality of goods 
and services provided by the briber and the price or quality that the 
customer would have accepted if its agent had not taken the bribe.121  
For example, in Fyffes Group Ltd. v. Templeman, the claimants 
involved in the banana trade claimed that from 1992 to 1996, their 
employee Simon Templeman took bribes amounting to over U.S. $1.4 
million from or with the connivance of the rest of the defendants in 
order to negotiate shipping contracts on terms favorable to the 
defendants.122 Fyffes sought to recover damages from the employee, 
the shipping company, and its agents.123 According to the Court, there 
was no dispute that the bribes had influenced the contractor in 
agreeing the amount of the freight for each year.124 As a result, all 
defendants were found jointly liable for the value of the bribe.125 In 
addition, the shipping company and its agent (the briber) were liable 
to pay additional compensation for the loss that the claimants had 
undergone from entering into the contract under unfavorable terms.126  
To calculate this liability, the Court found first that Fyffes would 
have entered into a service agreement with the contractor even if the 
employee had not been dishonest.127 As a result, ‘‘ordinary’’ profits 
resulting from the application of quantity or rates of shipment that 
would have been normally agreed by an honest and public negotiator 
were not the result of bribery.128 In order to calculate the 
‘‘unordinary’’ profit and the damages, the Court took into 
consideration testimony provided by shipping experts determining the 
difference between the amounts actually paid by Fyffes and the 
121. Id. at 33. See also JEAN-PIERRE BRUN ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL BANK 
FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT/THE WORLD BANK, ASSET 
RECOVERY HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 72--74 (2011) 
(providing a summary of the process by which financial information is 
sorted and analyzed after collection). 
122. Fyffes Group Ltd. v. Templeman, [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 643; (2000) 97 
(25) L.S.G. 40, QBD (Comm). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
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amounts that would have been paid, all things being equal, if Fyffes 
had been represented in the negotiations by an honest and prudent 
broker.129 
This example illustrates how the amount recovered will depend on 
the type of remedy sought. In disgorgement cases where courts assess 
the bribers’ ill-gotten gains by using the net revenue method, recovery 
will be limited to net profits even if they are less than damages 
generated by the contract entered into as a result of corruption. As a 
result, disgorgement may not ensure full compensation when services 
rendered are so deficient that, for instance, a piece of public 
infrastructure cannot be used or requires further expense to be put 
right. 
By contrast, compensation cases focus on the damages suffered by 
the affected party. When infrastructure is built in accordance with the 
technical requirements and at market rates, it is difficult to identify 
and prove a specific damage and disgorgement of profits earned may 
ensure a better result.  
Jurisdictions may also consider whether their legal framework 
allows them to combine both remedies, and claim compensation for 
damages in addition to profits to be disgorged. They may also 
consider contractual remedies.  
3. Contractual restitution 
In contractual litigation, the claimant may be entitled to recover 
all sums paid pursuant to the contract (gross revenue) or revenues 
after the deduction of the value of expenses and counter performance 
incurred by the briber (net revenue).130 In some jurisdictions courts 
have held that the government was entitled to recover all contractual 
fees already paid pursuant to the terms of the contract and that the 
contractor could not recover unpaid fees or the value of the work 
done.131 
In S.T. Grand Inc. v. City of New York, S.T. Grand had entered 
into a contract with the city of New York worth U.S. $840,000 to 
clean a reservoir.132 Grand had received U.S. $690,000 but it was 
subsequently exposed that the contract was awarded through the 
payment of a kickback to a city official.133 Grand sued the city for the 
129. Id. 
130. OECD/The World Bank, supra note 116, at 36. 
131. See S. T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 208 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. 
1973) (‘‘[W]here work is done pursuant to an illegal municipal contract, 
no recovery may be had by the vendor, either on the contract or in 
quantum meruit. . . . We have also declared that the municipality can 
recover from the vendor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.’’).  
132. Id. at 106. 
133. Id. at 108. 
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unpaid balance while the city counterclaimed to recover the amount it 
had already paid. The highest court of New York applied the general 
rule that ‘‘where work is done pursuant to an illegal municipal 
contract, no recovery may be had by the vendor, either on the 
contract or in quantum meruit.’’134 Thus, Grand was ordered to forego 
the entire amount of the contract, approximately U.S. $840,000. 
In other cases however, courts have declined restitution of the full 
value of a contract obtained through bribes, if the government of the 
bribed official benefited from the contract. Instead, the government 
may be awarded the contract price after deducting the value of any 
benefits it has received.  
In Case of Cameroon Airlines v. Transnet Ltd.,135 the ICC 
arbitration tribunal held that Cameroon Airlines, a state-owned 
company, was entitled to restitution of the sums paid under certain 
maintenance agreements concluded as a result of bribery, minus the 
‘‘fair value’’ of the services provided by Transnet.136 This ‘‘fair value’’ 
deductible from the amount paid consisted of the commercial price 
less the ‘‘commission’’ added by Transnet in order to recoup the 
bribes paid to Cameroon Airlines’ employees.137 The Tribunal held 
that ‘‘where an innocent party to a contract tainted by bribery seeks 
restitution of that which he has performed South African law requires 
that it must make or tender restitution of that which it has received 
or if this is not possible tender a monetary substitution of such 
benefits instead.’’138 The UK High Court of Justice annulled the 
award for procedural reasons, but agreed with the tribunal that 
Cameroon Airlines was not entitled to the full contract price because 
Transnet could exclude its own cost of rendering the services from 
restitution.139  
B. Quantification in Practice and Challenges 
Quantifying the proceeds of corruption cases and assessing the 
damages is one of the most difficult challenges faced by practitioners. 
In particular, the net revenue frequently used in disgorgement cases 
brings some particular complications that result from the need to 
identify deductible costs attributable to a specific corrupt contract. 
Material purchased or staff hired to fulfill this contract are generally 
134. Id. 
135. Cameroon Airlines v. Transnet Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 1829 
(Eng.). 
136. See id. ¶¶ 80--81. 
137. Id. ¶¶ 83--84. 
138. Id. ¶¶ 80, 123 (emphasis added). 
139. Id. ¶¶ 104--15. 
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considered variable costs that can be deducted.140 More problematic 
are fixed costs, which the company is incurring in any event, such as 
buildings or permanent staff and management who spend part of their 
time working on the contract tainted by bribery.141 While the method 
of allocating these costs is clearly defined in many businesses there 
will always be an element of judgment in determining if such fixed 
costs can be allocated to a specific contract. As a result, Governments 
or other entities seeking to recover compensation may need to get 
assistance from accounting experts to be able to present arguments to 
the court.  
Similarly, in contractual compensation litigation, detailed analysis 
from accounting as well as technical experts may be necessary to 
determine the ‘‘ordinary’’ market rates or profit margin of goods or 
services that were inflated by the contractor with the assistance of a 
corrupt official.142 In addition, compensation claims may require the 
calculation of interest income earned by the briber, or lost by the 
claimant, on amounts awarded as damages.143 When lengthy periods 
are considered, the determination of applicable interest rates and 
periods over which the interest is calculated will be crucial.  
More generally, some jurisdictions still lack legislation dealing 
with civil redress. There are others that may have legislation in place 
but have never tested it in practice while they consider calculations 
regarding profits obtained and damages suffered as too complicated. 
Only a few courts have addressed such issues, and judges generally 
still have very little experience. Even when countries have both 
adequate legislation in place and courts used to dealing with 
quantification issues, it is frequently difficult to identify the proceeds 
of corruption and calculate the profits due to the secrecy involved in 
corruption deals, especially when the bribery is revealed years after 
the contract was awarded.  
C. Beyond the Present----Emerging Theories----Punitive Damages and 
Social Damages 
Practitioners should bear in mind that civil remedies can be 
largely ineffective when they are perceived as a necessary business 
140. See Bernard C. Johnson, Damages----Breach of Contract----Accounting 
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 376 & n.3 (1968). 
141. Id. at 376 n.4, 378.  
142. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in 
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 
Inst. for Int’l Economics 1997) (commenting on the difficulty of 
quantifying corruption). 
143. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.600 (1999). 
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expense.144 Given the low probability of being caught, a company 
which engages in corrupt practices and is consistently awarded 
government contracts may just consider that being ordered to 
disgorge profits or to compensate damages resulting from one single 
case is the price to pay for making money later. At the limit it could 
be viewed as an investment.  
As Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that ‘‘[t]o act as a 
deterrent’’ penalties ‘‘would need to be a multiple of actual damages 
because those who pay bribes are often not caught.’’145 Multiple 
damage awards would not only act as an effective deterrent 
decreasing the numbers of infringements, but would also incentivize 
private plaintiffs to go to court. The most frequently stated purpose 
of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing 
and to deter him and others from similar misconduct.146 
The issues surrounding punitive damages warrant more specific 
discussion and go beyond the limits of this study. But punitive and 
treble damages are a settled practice in the United States. By 
contrast, most European states view damages purely as a 
‘‘compensatory instrument’’ and damage multipliers as inconsistent 
with the principles of compensation.  As a result, they tend to and 
oppose a system that would result in damages that are higher than 
the loss sustained by the victim.147  
In the case of the County of San Bernardino v. Kenneth Walsh, 
which involved two bribery schemes, the Court of Appeals held that 
‘‘the proper measure of damages is full disgorgement of any secret 
profit made by the fiduciary regardless of whether the principal 
suffered any damage.’’148 The court also upheld the award of punitive 
damages, finding it was justified due to the reprehensibility of the 
defendants’ conduct, the relationship between the punitive damages 
award, the compensatory damages award and the harm done, and the 
amount of the award in proportion to each defendant’s net worth.149 
144. Laura J. Kerrigan, The Decriminalization of Administrative Law 
Penalties----Civil Remedies, Alternatives, Policy, and Constitutional 
Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 380 (1993). 
145. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International 
Actors Play a Constructive Role?, 20 n.55 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin 
Ctr. for Studies in Law, Economics, & Public Policy Research Paper No. 
440), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926852.  
146. 1 LINDA SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2 (6th ed. 2010). 
147. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules 55, ¶ 182 (Apr. 2, 2008), available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2008:0 
404:FIN:EN:PDF. 
148. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 856 (Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
149. Id. at 858--59. 
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To ensure full compensation and deterrence when punitive damages 
are not applicable, other jurisdictions have tried to use the concept of 
social damages. In some jurisdictions, a social damage may be defined 
as the loss that is not incurred by specific groups or individuals but 
by the community as a whole. This could include damages to the 
environment, to the credibility of the institutions, or to collective 
rights including health, security, peace, education, good governance, 
and good public financial management. It is different from damages to 
collective rights, which belong to a restricted and identifiable group of 
individuals or legal entities. Social damage can be pecuniary and non-
pecuniary.  
Costa Rica follows a social damages model.150 In Costa Rica, 
prosecutors sought compensation for the social damage caused by 
Alcatel in paying bribes to government officials to secure cellular 
networks contracts.151 They filed a claim based on Article 38 of the 
Costa Rican Criminal Procedural Code that states that civil action 
for social harm may be brought by the Attorney General’s Office in 
the case of offenses involving collective or diffuse interests.152  
In its claim, the Attorney General’s office underlined that the 
Costa Rican Constitutional Court had previously defined as 
‘‘collective and diffuse interests,’’ the ‘‘citizen’s collective interest in 
good public finance management’’ and ‘‘the inhabitant’s right to a 
healthy environment.’’153 To measure the social damages, the office of 
the Attorney General hired an external consultant to undertake an 
estimation of damages using a methodology that combined the 
following elements:  
• The economic consequences of corruption that reduced the 
investor’s trust in the Costa Rican Government;154 and 
• The political consequences that reduced the credibility of 
politicians and political parties and thus affecting 
(increasing) the levels of abstentions in the elections of 
2006.155  
150. See generally Juanita Olaya, Kodjo Attisso & Anja Roth, Repairing 
Social Damage Out of Corruption Cases: Opportunities and Challenges 
As Illustrated in the Alcatel Case in Costa Rica (Basel Inst. on 
Governance, Working Paper, 2010), available at papers.ssrn.com/5d 
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1779834. 
151. See id. at 8--9.  
152. See id. at 15--17. 
153. Id. at 15. 
154. Id. at 17. 
155. Id. 
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To quantify these consequences, experts used a combination of 
quantitative analysis and survey data on the average citizen’s 
perception to explain and measure the impact.156 However, 
establishing causality both for providing evidence of immaterial social 
damage and measuring this damage proved challenging. For example, 
it was difficult to define what would have been the level of trust in 
the Costa Rican government in the absence of Alcatel’s corrupt 
activities. It was similarly complex to quantify the economic 
consequences of the loss of trust alleged by prosecutors.157  
In addition, a precedent-setting case involving bribery and 
kickbacks in the purchase of medical equipment for the Social 
Security System in Costa Rica had previously highlighted the 
challenges involved in the concept of social damage. In this case, 
prosecutors had sought compensation for social damages estimated to 
be around U.S. $89 million, but the court dismissed the evidence.158 
The Attorney General finally accepted a settlement by which the 
claims for social damage were dismissed and Alcatel agreed to pay 
U.S. $10 million.159 
IV. Conclusion 
This article is meant to contribute to the rapidly expanding 
debate on corruption and how to deal with it. The citizen’s cry for 
justice heard all around the world, from the protests in Cairo to the 
outrage over the off-shore leaks, demands that perpetrators are 
brought to trial and sentenced, but also that their stolen assets and 
profits be returned to the victims. We have tried to show how civil 
action can contribute towards this second objective. To be sure, the 
amounts of money recovered and repatriated to victim countries so 
far are low-----and not commensurate to the scale of theft of public 
assets and corruption worldwide. The discipline of asset recovery is 
still young and experienced practitioners who can assist countries in 
charting a course through what is always a terribly complex and 
confusing field are few and far between. However, mounting interest 
in the topic, the G8 call for transparency and heightened media 
scrutiny are changing that and are coming together to force action. 
Let us hope that some of the tools outlined in the paper will provide 
an avenue to guide such action. 
 
156. Id. at 22. 
157. See id. 
158. Id. at 24. 
159. Id. at 10. 
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